testing, Kuhn provocatively declares, 'In a sense, to turn Sir Karl's view on its head, it is precisely the abandonment of critical discourse that marks the transition to a science' (Kuhn, 'Reflections on My Critics',1 p. 273, emphasis added).
If only we would view the highlights of the Popperian landscape through his spectacles, Kuhn proposes, we would come to see how Popper's view gets turned on its head. Specifically, we would see why, where Popper sees a fundamental theory failing a severe test, Kuhn sees a paradigm failing in its 'puzzle-solving ability' (crisis), and why, where Popper sees a lack of testability, Kuhn sees a lack of puzzle-solving. In so doing, Kuhn assures us, we would begin to see the sense in which 'severity of test-criteria is simply one side of the coin whose other face is a puzzle-solving tradition', and with this, Kuhn proclaims, 'Sir Karl's duck may at last become my rabbit' (p. 7).
I propose that we look at the high points of the Popperian landscape that the Kuhn's-eye view brings into focus. The main highlights that interest me underlie the following portions of the above passages:
(1) 'it is normal science, in which Sir Karl's sort of testing does not occur, rather than extraordinary science which most nearly distinguishes science from other enterprises.' (2) 'it is precisely the abandonment of critical discourse that marks the transition to a science.' (3) 'severity of test-criteria is simply one side of the coin whose other face is a puzzle-solving tradition' (p. 7).
In order to extract the epistemological lessons I am after, however, spectacles capable of seeing the normative dimension are required.
Turning Popper's duck into Kuhn's rabbit
Imre Lakatos set about providing a normative interpretation of Kuhn, yet what I am proposing should not be confused with the Lakatosian model. Lakatos's gambit is to reconstruct Kuhn's socio-psychological description of paradigm change by cloaking it in terms of rational changes of research programmes: 'I look at continuity in science through "Popperian spectacles". Where Kuhn sees "paradigms", I also see rational research programmes' (Lakatos [1970] , p. 177)2. My task differs from that of Lakatos in three key ways. First, in his 1I will hereafter refer to this article as 'Reflections'. 2 Lakatos provides this interesting way to view his reconstruction: 'my concept ofa "research programme" may be construed as an objective, 'third world' reconstruction of Kuhn's sociopsychological concept of paradigm': thus the Kuhnian 'Gestalt-Switch' can be performed without removing one's Popperian spectacles' (Lakatos [1970] , p. 179, n. 1). So, as I read Kuhn, for a hypothesis to pass the test of experiment it must have passed 'enough or stringent enough tests', and to accept a normal hypothesis is to accept it as correctly solving the associated normal problem. If the hypothesis fails the test, it is concluded that it does not solve the puzzle (that it is incorrect or is false). Blaming the background theory is tantamount to changing the puzzle and is disallowed. Indeed, in my reading, the main purpose of calling a normal problem a 'puzzle' is to call attention to the fundamental restriction on what counts as an admissible solution: if a conjectured solution fails the test only the conjecture and 'not the corpus of current science is impugned' by the failure (p. 5).
Kuhn shows, as an example, how some eighteenth-century scientists, finding anomalies between the observed motions of the moon and Newton's laws, 'suggested replacing the inverse square law with a law that deviated from it at small distances. To do that, however, would have been to change the paradigm, to define a new puzzle, and not to solve the old one' (Kuhn [1962] , p. 39). This was not an admissible solution. The normal scientist must face the music.
Underlying the stringency demand, I propose, is the implied requirement that before a hypothesis H is taken to solve a problem H must have stood up to scrutiny: if a hypothesis H is taken to solve the problem it must be very unlikely that it really does not solve the problem. This requirement, which we may call the reliability or severity requirement, is one that I develop elsewhere.3 It requires that normal scientists declare a problem solved by a hypothesized solution H only if H has withstood a severe scrutiny-one that H would very probably have failed, were it not a correct solution. In testing solution H, normal scientists design tools to discriminate correct from erroneous solutions. It is a principal value of normal science to be able to put together so potent an arsenal for unearthing an erroneous solution to a puzzle that, when no error is found, there are excellent grounds for concluding that the error is absent.4
It is only by some such reliability or severity requirement, I maintain, that Kuhn is right to locate the growth of knowledge in normal science. It shows how Kuhn can be correct to regard it as a better research strategy to focus on normal testing rather than on Popperian testing (which he views as criticizing fundamental theories). The reason, I propose, is that one learns much more through normal testing.5
After all, why does Kuhn say that, in the fact of a rich enough theory to 'support a puzzle solving tradition', it is fruitful to concentrate on normal problems? The answer that my spectacles discern is this: if one has an interesting theory, one with predictions, suggestions for improvement, challenging puzzles, and so on, then taking up its challenges will teach a great deal, and a portion of what is learned will remain despite changes in theory. With respect to the solved problems in normal research, Kuhn says 'at least part of that achievement always proves to be permanent' ([1962] , p. 25). To ignore its challenges is to forfeit this knowledge.
One can go further. Pursuing normal problems is a good strategy because, if there are anomalies that call for changes in theory, doing so will reveal them as well as help point to the adjustments indicated:
In the developed sciences ... it is technical puzzles that provide the usual occasion and often the concrete methods for revolution ... Because they can ordinarily take current theory for granted, exploiting rather than criticizing it, the practitioners of mature sciences are freed to explore nature to an esoteric depth and detail otherwise unimaginable. Because that exploration will ultimately isolate severe trouble spots, they can be confident that the pursuit ofnormal science will inform them when and where they can most usefully become Popperian critics ('Reflections', p. 247, emphasis added).
In short, the rationale for pursuing normal problems is that (if done right) some positive payoff is assured. If normal science yields problem 3 I do so in Mayo [1991] and, much more fully, in Mayo [1996] . For a discussion of the difference between my notion of severity and that of Popper, see Mayo [1996] . 4 I call this an 'argument from error'. An analogous argument would be given for concluding that an error is present-that H is not a correct solution to the problem. 
Astrology
In making out his contrast with Popper, Kuhn takes the example of astrology, wishing to avoid controversial areas like psychoanalysis (p. 7). Kuhn's focus, he says, is on the centuries during which astrology was intellectually respectable.6 Astrology was unscientific, says Kuhn, not because it failed to be falsifiable nor even because of how practitioners of astrology explained failed predictions. The problem is that astrologers had no puzzles, they could not or did not engage in normal science. Let us try to unpack this.
Engaging in normal science requires a series of puzzles and strict criteria that all practitioners agree to use to tell if puzzles are solved. But a practice does not automatically become scientific by erecting a series of puzzles and rules to pronounce them solved or not. Becoming a genuine science is not something that can occur by community decree, nor does Kuhn think it is.7 Kuhn balks at those who would find in him recipes for becoming scientific, apparently unaware of how he invites this reading by failing to articulate the kinds of tests needed to carry out normal science legitimately and why only these tests qualify. Still, there are several places where Kuhn hints at the criteria normal testing requires (namely, reliability or stringency). The most telling of all, I find, is Kuhn's critique of astrology.
With astrology, Kuhn observes, not only are the predictions statistical, there is a tremendous amount of 'noise' from background uncertainties.
Astrologers pointed out, for example, that ... the forecast of an individual's future was an immensely complex task, demanding the utmost skill, and extremely sensitive to minor errors in relevant data. The configuration of the stars and eight planets was constantly changing; the astronomical tables used to compute the configuration at an individual's birth were notoriously imperfect; few men knew the instant of their birth with the requisite precision. No wonder, then, that forecasts often failed (p. 8).
Kuhn's point seems to be this: astrology, during the centuries when it was reputable, did not fail to be scientific because it was not testable nor because practitioners did not take failures as grounds to overthrow astrology. There are plenty of perfectly good sciences that would act similarly. The reason the practice of astrology was unscientific is that practitioners did not or could not learn from failed predictions.8 And they could not learn from them because there were too many justifiable ways to explain failure. They could not use failures or anomalies constructively.
The occurrence of failures could be explained, but particular failures did not give rise to research puzzles, for no man, however skilled, could make use of them in a constructive attempt to revise the astrological tradition. There were too many sources of difficulty, most of them beyond the astrologer's knowledge, control, or responsibility. Individual failures were correspondingly uninformative ('Reflections', p. 276).
The above passage is most revealing. For failed predictions to 'give rise to research puzzles' a failure must give rise to a fairly well-defined problem--specifically, the problem of how to explain it. It must be possible, in other words, to set up a reliable enquiry to determine its cause and/or modifications called for. This is the kind of information normal tests can provide.
Compare the situations of the astronomer and the astrologer. If an astronomer's prediction failed and his calculations checked, he could hope to set the situation right. Perhaps the data were are fault ... Or perhaps theory needed adjustment ... The astrologer, by contrast, had no such puzzles (p. 9).
In order to 'set the situation right' one needs to be able to discriminate between proposed explanations of the failure. Unless one can set up a stringent enough test of a hypothesized explanation (so that its passing can reliably be attributed to its being correct), then that failed prediction is unconstructive and uninformative.
By the same token, so long as there is no way to cut down these alternative explanations of failure, there are no grounds for arguing that the failures should have been attributed to the falsity of astrology as a whole. In other words, if failed predictions do not give rise to research puzzles (reliable enquiries into their cause), then one cannot come to learn whether and, if so, how they can be explained within the global background theory. Thus, they cannot warrant discrediting the whole theory; they cannot warrant (Popperian) critical discourse.
Unwarranted critical discourse
The practitioners of astrology, Kuhn notes, 'like practitioners of philosophy and of some social sciences ... belonged to a variety of different schools, and the interschool strife was sometimes bitter. But ... [f]ailures of individual predictions played very little role' (p. 9, n. 2). Practitioners were happy to criticize the basic commitments of competing astrological schools; rival schools were constantly having their basic presuppositions challenged. What they lacked was that very special kind of criticism that allows genuine learning-the kind where a failed prediction can be pinned on a specific hypothesis. Their criticism was not constructive: a failure did not genuinely indicate a specific improvement, adjustment, or falsification.
Thus I propose to construe the real force of Kuhn's disparaging practices 'whose normal mode is critical discourse' as disparaging those practices that engage in criticism even where the criticism fails to be driven by the constrained tests that exemplify good normal science. What is being disparaged, and rightly so, is unwarranted and unconstructive criticism. When the day-to-day practice is criticism that is not the result of the stringent constraints of normal testing, then that criticism is of the unwarranted or unconstructive variety. It is mere critical discourse. Non-sciences engage in mere critical discourse, not genuine criticism that allows learning from empirical tests.
The situation in astrology exemplified an extreme case of a situation in which severe tests are precluded. The situation might be described in modern statistical terms as having too much uncontrolled variability, or as lacking a way to distinguish the 'signal' from the noise. The situation is typical, Kuhn notes, of practices that one might call 'crafts', some of which eventually manage to make the transition to sciences (e.g. medicine). The transition from craft to science, Kuhn observes, correlates with supporting normal science or normal testing.
To see how, let us go to a practice that, unlike astrology, is sufficiently developed to support normal testing (puzzle-solving). If a hypothesized solution to a normal problem fails a test, it could, theoretically, be accounted for by alleging a fundamental flaw in the underlying theorybut such a criticism would very likely be unwarranted (at least not just from this one failure). Thus to proceed regularly this way would very often be in error, thereby violating the reliability requirement of normal testing. On these grounds, normal science calls for abandoning this type of criticism. For the same reason, it admonishes the practice of dealing with a failed solution (failed hypothesis) by changing the problem it was supposed to solve. An enterprise that regularly allowed such a cavalier attitude towards failure would often be misled.
Changing the problem, blaming one's testing tools or the background theory where these are unwarranted, is the kind of criticism that should be disallowed. Only then can the practice of hypothesis appraisal be sufficiently constrained so as to identify correctly genuine effects, gain experimental knowledge-more generally, accomplish the tasks of normal science reliably. Thus recast, Kuhn's demarcation criterion may be seen to pick out those practices that afford experimental learning. For my part, I suggest we view such a demarcation criterion as indicating when particular enquiries, rather than whole practices, are scientific. It becomes, roughly:
Demarcating scientific inquiry: what makes an empirical enquiry scientific is that it can and does learn from normal tests, that it can accomplish one or more tasks of normal testing reliably.9
This criterion becomes more specific when particular types of normal test results are substituted.10
Summary of previous sections
Our analysis has so far brought us to the following recasting of the Kuhnian observations with which we began: to understand the nature of the growth of scientific knowledge one should look to tests of hypotheses about specific types of experiments (normal experimental testing). An adequate account of normal testing should be one that serves each of the functions Kuhn accords it, with the additional proviso that it do so reliably and with warrant. Seen through our spectacles, what distinguishes Kuhn's demarcation from Popper's is that for Kuhn the aim is not mere criticism but constructive criticism.
Our recasting of normal science, I believe, substantiates the three highlights of Kuhn's contrast with Popper with which we began. Let me repeat them here: (1) 'it is normal science, in which Sir Karl's sort of testing does 9 The demarcation criterion that emerges should really be qualified to refer only to enterprises for predicting, controling, or understanding the world, in short, to intended sciences. It would not be a disparagement, say, of art, to violate this criterion. 10 For example, an important type of normal test result is a failed prediction. The difference between a scientific and an unscientific treatment of a failed prediction is the extent to which it is used to learn (about its cause, about needed modifications, etc.). not occur, rather than extraordinary science which most nearly distinguishes science from other enterprises'; (2) 'it is precisely the abandonment of critical discourse that marks the transition to a science'; (3) 'severity of test-criteria is simply one side of the coin whose other face is a puzzle-solving [i.e. a normal science] tradition' (p. 7). Briefly, our gloss on them went as follows: the fundamental features of scientific enquiries are to be found in the criteria of normal testing, and these criteria demand stringent normal tests, not (uninformative) attacks on fundamental theory. Because anomalies that are reliably produced in normal tests indicate real effects that will not go away, they provide the most severe tests of theories-when these are warranted. This explains Kuhn's promise that scientists 'can be confident that the pursuit of normal science will inform them when and where they can most usefully become 
Experimental testing models (error paradigms)
Significantly, Kuhn remarks that he was originally led to the concept of a 'paradigm' in thinking of the concrete problem solutions or exemplars that practitioners share and which enable them to agree if a problem is solved ('Reflections', p. 272). This is the role I propose to give to certain experimental testing models or testing exemplars. Kuhn's own use of the example of astrology (as a classic non-science) is itself an example of what I have in mind here. Nevertheless, I depart from Kuhn in several important ways. The main difference is that, in my view, standard examples or normal testing exemplars are not a set of tools available only to those working within a given global theory or paradigm. Instead, they consist of any models and methods relevant for testing solutions of normal problems, and these come from various background theories, from mathematics, statistics, and from theories of instruments and experiments. While this and related departures result in a view of normal science very different from Kuhn's official position, it is quite in keeping with my normative recasting of Kuhn. By Kuhn's own lights, before normal practitioners may take a puzzle as solved, the hypothesized solution must have passed stringent enough tests. The arsenal needed for normal testing, then, is a host of tools for detecting whether and how conjectured hypotheses (of a given type) can fail. They call for methods capable not just of determining whether a hypothesis correctly solves a problem, but of doing so reliably.
However, Kuhn fails to disentangle the experimental testing portion of the paradigm from immersion in a research programme. As such, it is not surprising that global theory change winds up appearing arational-quite like the (experimentally) unwarranted critical discourse Kuhn attributes to non-sciences. It is as if the very process that allows practices to become scientific starts to go in reverse, until we are back to 'mere' critical discourse: critical discourse recurs only at moments of crisis when the bases of the field are again in jeopardy. Only when they must choose between competing theories do scientists behave like philosophers (pp. 6-7).
The circularity thesis
Kuhn supposes that members of competing global theories necessarily subscribe to different values and standards in such a way as to make it inevitable that one's own global theory gets defended. This thesis, which we may call the circularity thesis, is most clearly stated in Structure.
Like the choice between competing political institutions, that between competing paradigms proves to be a choice between incompatible modes of community life. When paradigms enter, as they must, into a debate about paradigm choice, their role is necessarily circular. Each group uses its own paradigm to argue in that paradigm's defense ([1962] , p. 94).
They will inevitably talk through each other when debating the relative merits of their respective paradigms. In the partially circular arguments that regularly result, each paradigm will be shown to satisfy more or less the criteria that it dictates for itself and to fall short of a few of those dictated by its opponent (ibid., pp. 109-10). Such defences may and do occur, but they do not count as warranted-by the strictures of good normal science. Why? Because they come down to a blanket refusal to acknowledge that a hypothesized solution to a normal problem fails, and that betrays an essential requirement of normal science.12
Let us sketch what happens, according to Kuhn's circularity thesis, when a global theory, T1, slips into a crisis. Within T1, which we are assuming to be a genuine science with a normal tradition and so on, genuine anomalies have been identified. These anomalies identify genuine effects that need explaining. These give rise to normal puzzles, i.e. normal testing, to scrutinize attempted solutions, to 'set the situation right'. The criteria of T1, by dint of its enjoying a normal science tradition, severely constrain attempts to deal with such anomalies. A genuine crisis is afoot when, after considerable effort, T1 is unable to explain away the anomalies as due either to initial conditions or background hypotheses.
Notice, it follows that the normal (experimental) testing criteria of T1 themselves serve to warrant the existence of anomalies and crisis. They, incorporating as they must, the general criteria of normal testing, indicate when an anomaly is real and (as Kuhn himself says) 'unevadable'. That is, they indicate when to put blame elsewhere is tantamount to unwarranted criticism. Do they not, by the same token, indicate that any attempt to save a theory-if that defence depends upon evading the anomaly-violates the very norms upon which enjoying a normal 'puzzle-solving' tradition depends? The norms bar procedures of admitting hypotheses as solutions to puzzles, we saw, if they would often do so erroneously. Of course, it may take a while until attempted defences come up against the wall of normal testing strictures. But with a genuine crisis, it seems to me, that is exactly what happens. Moreover, from Kuhn's demarcation criterion, it is possible to recognize (even if not sharply) that a practice is losing its normal puzzlesolving ability. (Astrology serves as a kind of exemplar of a practice that falls over on to the non-science line.) These remarks should not be misunderstood. What normal science must condemn is not saving a global theory in the face of severe anomalyalthough that is what Popperian spectacles might have us see. What it must condemn (recalling Kuhn's demarcation) is being incapable of learning from normal testing. In any particular case, the obstacles to learning that are condemned are very specific: having to reject experimentally demonstrated effects, contradict known parameter values, change known error distributions of instruments or background factors, and so on.
Consider what Kuhn calls for when scientists, having split off from global theory T1 to develop some rival T2, come knocking on the door of their less adventurous colleagues, who are still muddling through the crisis in T1. Confronted with rival T2, which, let us suppose, solves TI's crisis-provoking problem, crisis scientists in T1 necessarily defend T1 circularly. This circularity thesis requires them to do a turn-about and maintain that T, will eventually solve this problem, or that the problem was not really very important after all. Once the members of rival T2 go away (back to their own worlds, presumably), members of T1 can resume their brooding about the crisis they have identified with their paradigm. Were they to do this, they would indeed be guilty of the unwarranted criticism and mere name-calling Kuhn finds typical of non-sciences. But Kuhn has given no argument to suppose that crisis scientists necessarily do this. Nor will one find an argument as to why Kuhn takes away what I thought he had promised us-that a crisis compelled by good normal science lets us finally be warranted Popperian testers, and reject the theory (as having it wrong at least so far as its key hypotheses go)-quite apart from stopping work on it. Instead one finds that, when turning his gaze to the problem of large-scale theory appraisal, Kuhn is simply wearing spectacles that necessarily overlook the role of the shared strictures and arguments of normal testing.
Let me be clear about what I am claiming. I do not assert that experimental arguments always exist to guide theory appraisal, but rather deny Kuhn's claim that they never do. In order for experimental arguments to ground theory appraisal, moreoever, the experimental testing frameworks of the rival large-scale theories need not be identical. It is sufficient for the needed arguments to be made out by appeal to the interparadigmatic normal testing tools. How can we suppose such a shared understanding? It follows from taking seriously the criteria for good normal scientific practice, criteria which, for Kuhn, must hold for any practice that enjoys a normal scientific tradition. Moreover, the historical record reveals case after case where even the most ardent proponents are forced to relent on the basis of very local, but very powerful experimental tests. The Kuhn of normal science can explain this consensus quite naturally; the Kuhn of revolutionary science cannot.
A Kuhnian may agree with my thesis about shared testing models, yet deny that the experimental arguments provided offer a basis for appraising global theories. Nevertheless, that is still no argument for Kuhn's thesis that global theory change cannot turn on experimental arguments, and, indeed, Kuhn fails to supply one. Rather, his thesis results from assumptions I have not addressed here-that theory change is a conversion experience, that it requires one to 'go native', and is complete only when the new theory establishes a grip on one's mind. They, like the circularity thesis, should be rejected. The distinction identified by the demarcation criterion (although it is not intended to be sharp and may well admit of degrees) is not between theories but between enquiries that are scientific or informative, and those that are not. Enquiries are informative to the extent that they enable experimental knowledge, that is, learning from normal science. Taking Popperian aim at global theories when this is not constrained by severe normal testing is a poor strategy for obtaining experimental knowledge. The constraints of normal testing provide the basis for severe tests and informative scientific enquiries. To understand the nature and growth of experimental knowledge, it is to normal testing that one must look.
For Kuhn, in a genuine science, anomalies give rise to research puzzles. In our recasting of Kuhn this becomes, in a genuinely scientific enquiry, anomalies afford opportunities for learning-opportunities for learning from error. The aim of science is not avoiding anomaly and error, in our view. The aim is being able to learn from anomaly and error. 
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